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Background: In most jurisdictions, policies have been adopted to encourage the development of treatments for
rare or orphan diseases. While successful as assessed against their primary objective, these policies have
prompted concerns among payers about the economic burden that might be caused by an annual cost per patient
in some cases exceeding 100,000 Euro. At the same time, many drugs for rare disorders do not meet conventional
standards for cost-effectiveness or ‘value for money’. Owing to the fixed (volume-independent) cost of research
and development, this issue is becoming increasingly serious with decreasing prevalence of a given disorder.
Methods: In order to critically appraise the problems posed by the systematic valuation of interventions for
ultra-rare disorders (URDs), an international group of clinical and health economic experts was convened in
conjunction with the Annual European ISPORCongress in Berlin, Germany, in November 2012. Following this
meeting and during subsequent deliberations, the group achieved a consensus on the specific challenges and
potential ways forward.
Results: The group concluded that the complexities of research and development for new treatments for
URDs may require conditional approval and reimbursement policies, such as managed entry schemes and
coverage with evidence development agreements, but should not use as justification surrogate end point
improvement only. As a prerequisite for value assessment, the demonstration of a minimum significant
clinical benefit should be expected within a reasonable time frame. As to the health economic evaluation of
interventions for URDs, the currently prevailing logic of cost-effectiveness (using benchmarks for the
maximum allowable incremental cost per quality-adjusted life year gained) was considered deficient as it does
not capture well-established social preferences regarding health care resource allocation.
Conclusion: Modified approaches or alternative paradigms to establish the ‘value for money’ conferred by
interventions for URDs should be developed with high priority.
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T
his paper documents an international expert con-
sensus that emerged from debate during a face-to-
face meeting in Berlin, Germany, on 8 November
2012, followed by an exchange of thoughts by phone
and mail on two draft versions, describing the results
of the workshop. A prefinal version of the document was
completed by 19 July 2013, and the consensus was
confirmed and refined at subsequent workshops of the
expert group in Dublin, Ireland, on 7 November 2013
and in Amsterdam, Netherlands, 13 November 2014.
The reasoning underlying the consensus statement has
been published separately in a peer-reviewed paper, which
provides an extensive overview and discussion of impor-
tant references on the subject (1). In the following sections,
we present the original consensus statement with very
minor edits only. The edits do not change the material
content but were introduced with the objective to make the
paper more intelligible, incorporating helpful advice from
two anonymous reviewers.
Background and problem statement
In the United States and the European Union, as well as
in Japan, Australia, and some other jurisdictions, legisla-
tion has been adopted to encourage the development
of treatments for rare or orphan diseases. Under this
legislation, developers and manufacturers of so-called
orphan drugs used to treat orphan diseases benefit from a
range of incentives, including reduced or waived licensing
fees, extended market exclusivity periods, and, in the
United States and Japan, tax relief on development costs.
In theory, there are no distinct (sub-) categories of rare
and ultra-rare disorders (URDs) and treatments. Increas-
ing rarity of a condition merely represents the end of a
continuum, just like increasing severity and increasing
comorbidities represent continuous, not discrete phenom-
ena. For policy makers, it may nevertheless be pragmatic
to define different categories of disorders and interven-
tions, irrespective of the (absence of) theoretical merits of
such an approach.
The term ‘orphan disorders’ has been defined by US and
EU legislation. In the United States, these are disorders
with a prevalence of fewer than 200,000 affected persons;
in the European Union, prevalence must be less than 5 per
10,000 (or less than 0.05%) of the population. Currently,
no official definition of ‘ultra-orphan disorders’ has been
adopted globally. Rather, this informal subcategory was
introduced by the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) (formerly the Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence and the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence), who applied it to drugs with indications for
conditions with a prevalence of less than 1 per 50,000
persons (2). The definition, albeit no less arbitrary than the
definitions used for ‘orphan disorders’, corresponds to
the even more restricted prevalence criteria adopted by
England’s Advisory Group for National Specialist Ser-
vices, assigned to review technologies for URDs that treat
fewer than 500 persons in England (i.e., approximately 1 in
100,000 of the English population).
It is easy to see that many drugs developed to treat
URDs will not meet the cost-effectiveness thresholds sti-
pulated by some official regulatory bodies such as NICE,
that is, not to exceed a cost of £20,000£30,000 per quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) gained (Table 1). Given the
largely fixed (i.e., independent from sales volume) costs of
research and development, it seems plausible that this
challenge will increase in relevance with decreasing pre-
valence rates, especially with drugs developed to treat very
small patient populations (cf. Fig. 1, below).
The introduction of an ultra-orphan category by NICE
can thus be interpreted as a defensive move, responding to
political and public pressures that NICE experienced as a
reaction to negative appraisals. It also can be seen as an
attempt to protect NICE’s evaluation framework, while at
the same time recognizing that this framework (in an
unspecified way) ‘does not work’ for ultra-orphan drugs.
A similar move by NICE was the introduction of a
second special category, so-called end-of-life treatments.
The need to create exceptions may point to deeper issues
affecting the generalizabilityof the ‘logic of cost-effectiveness’
as adopted by NICE. It has been argued that at least
some of these issues may indeed relate to well-understood
deficiencies of the logic of cost-effectiveness (or the ‘extra-
welfarist proposition’, the foundations of which will be
discussed later).
Apparently, there is a serious mismatch between reim-
bursement policies based on the logic of cost-effectiveness
Table 1. Preliminary cost per QALY ICER estimates by NICE (2005) (2), illustrating the mismatch between utra-orphan drug cost and
conventional cost-effectiveness benchmarks (as, e.g., adopted by NICE, from £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained)
Condition Prevalence (England) Product ICER (preliminary estimated cost in GBP per QALY)
M. Gaucher Type I and III 270 Imiglucerase (CeredaseR) 391,200
MPS Type 1 130 Laronidase (AldurazymeR) 334,900
M. Fabry 200 Agalsidase beta (FabrazymeR) 203,000
Hemophilia B 350 Nonacog alpha (BeneFIXR) 172,500
M. Gaucher Type I 270 Miglustat (ZavescaR) 116,800
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratios; QALY, quality-adjusted life years; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.
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with cost-per-QALY benchmarks, on the one hand, and
international policies designed to encourage research and
development into rare and URDs and their effective
treatment, on the other hand. As such, there appears
to be an unmet need for a coherent value framework
reflecting all attributes of health technologies deemed
relevant by the public (‘social preferences’), while at the
same time remaining consistent with prior normative
commitments as entailed by institutional and legal tradi-
tions. Such a framework should also enable decision
makers to effectively address the specific challenges that
are posed by health technology assessments (HTAs) of
interventions for diagnosis and treatment of rare and
URDs, combining fair access to effective interventions
(for patients) with incentives for research, development,
and ‘innovation’ (for manufacturers) and a set of clear
principles for setting limits (for policy makers and payers).
Objectives and methods
In order to address this situation, the not-for-profit
Institute for Innovation and Valuation in Health Care
(Wiesbaden, Germany) convened an international expert
workshop in Berlin, Germany, on 8 November 2012.1
Organization of the 1-day workshop was supported by
two biopharmaceutical firms, Alexion (Cheshire, CT,
USA) and BioMarin (San Rafael, CA, USA), under an
unrestricted educational grant policy.
The objectives of the workshop were as follows:
1) To review the challenges that arise when apply-
ing conventional HTA methodologies to medical
technologies for ultra-rare diseases
2) Given these challenges, to seek expert agreement on
the need for (improved or) alternative evaluation
methods, ideally in the form of a consensus statement
3) In light of this analysis, to initiate discussion of
improved or alternative evaluation methods, includ-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of different
options and possible ways forward
The agreed workshop agenda (Appendix II) adhered
closely to the objectives set out above.
In order to facilitate an open exchange of ideas and
views in the process, the workshop participants agreed to
comply with the Chatham House Rule: ‘When a meeting,
or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule,
participants are free to use the information received, but
neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s),
nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’.
After the workshop, two consecutive draft summary
documents were distributed to the participating experts,
whose comments were integrated in an iterative process, lea-
ding to the final consensus document presented here. The
consensus was formally adopted at subsequent meetings of
the expert group in Dublin, Ireland, on 7 November 2013,
and in Amsterdam, Netherlands, on 13 November 2014.
Workshop participants agreed that the project should
begin with a situation analysis in order to establish
common ground for future deliberation by the expert
panel. To this end, various levels of analysis were
distinguished, namely a focus on the following:
1) The principles underlying the current evaluation
framework.
2) The actual evaluation policies implemented by HTA
agencies and regulatory bodies (primarily those con-
cerned with pricing and reimbursement decisions).
3) Evaluation practice when principles and policies are
applied to real-world problems. In particular, the
third level would have to include case studies,
including cases where existing regulation has been
potentially misused.
The group agreed that discussion should initially focus
on fundamental principles, because policy implementa-
tion and evaluation practice (although clearly relevant
dimensions) represent hierarchically lower levels of analy-
sis. Review of the latter should be done with reference to
a set of high-level guiding principles agreed on prior to
moving to application.
Definitions
While recognizing the somewhat arbitrary nature of this
cut-off criterion, the expert group agreed to focus on
medical technologies targeting URDs (with a prevalence
of less than 1 per 50,000), that is, to exclude from further
analysis the following related but different subject areas:
1) Orphan disorders with a prevalence of less than 5/
10,000 (or less than 1/2,000) but more than 1/50,0001For a complete list of workshop participants, see Appendix I.
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Fig 1. Increasing acquisition cost per patient with decreasing
prevalence, as a result of fixed (i.e., largely volume-independent)
research and development expenditures. [Adapted from Schlander
and Beck ((3), p. 1290); based on original data from Alcimed (4)].
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2) Cancer medicine (given its distinct characteristics,
including the frequently observed gradual expansion
of indications, for example by moving treatments
from third or fourth line to second line, combined,
or adjuvant use in early stage disease)
3) The specific challenges posed by emerging concepts
of ‘personalized medicine’
4) Also, for the time being (cf. above), abusive com-
mercial ploys such as ‘indication slicing’ and other
strategic games played by some manufacturers2
Further characteristics of URDs under consideration
should include conditions that
. Are severe.
. Are chronic.
. Represent clearly defined biological entities (i.e., are
not ‘created’ by artificial ‘slicing’ of a biologically
much broader and more prevalent indication).
. Hence, are associated with a broadly accepted
high unmet medical need. However, the absence
of alternative treatment options was not considered
a necessary defining condition of an URD, as
the broader criterion of ‘high unmet medical need’
was believed to better capture the underlying
rationale.
The subjects of analysis were specific (unique)
condition/treatment pairs fulfilling the criteria listed
above, combined with a clear biological rationale. The
typical case the workshop participants had in mind were
treatments that are effective for one URD only (such as
enzyme replacement therapies for hereditary lysosomal
storage disorders). The panel shared the view that
certain adjustments would probably be necessary when
one drug works in more than one URD indication.
However, these adjustments were considered likely to be
of a rather technical nature and hence were not explored
in detail at the workshop, as its primary focus was
on discussion of underlying fundamental evaluation
principles.
Results: specific challenges
While recognizing the continuum (instead of an arbitrary
prevalence threshold) related to increasing ‘rarity’, the
group of experts agreed that, in principle, a number of
typical challenges must be expected when dealing with
interventions for URDs. The most serious ones fall into
one or both of the following categories: 1) the need to
establish evidence of clinical effectiveness and 2) the need
to demonstrate ‘value for money’.
Establishing evidence of clinical effectiveness
Developing treatments for URDs is a more challenging,
complex, and sometimes risky endeavor than developing
treatments for more common diseases, as
. Less clinical/medical research is often available for
URDs, resulting in a limited clinical understanding.
. There is usually a very small number of physicians
with specialized expertise, who are based in a few
specialized centers.
. Unusual difficulties exist to produce robust clinical
evidence, for example, because of limited under-
standing of the natural history of URDs and
because of the often-limited availability of validated
instruments to measure disease severity and progres-
sion.
. This, combined with difficulties to generate a large
volume of evidence for URDs based on randomized
clinical trials, may lead to higher levels of uncer-
tainty surrounding effect size estimators.
. Significant hurdles exist when trying to identify and
accurately diagnose patients with URDs.
. Because the small number of patients are often
geographically dispersed, multiple clinical trial sites
must be established for only a few patients.
. Ongoing postmarketing requirements, including re-
gistries and risk management plans, must be created
and maintained globally for only a small number of
patients.
. As a consequence, in a significant number of cases,
the safety and efficacy profiles of orphan drugs have
been incomplete, and often marketing authoriza-
tions were based on small-scale studies addressing
surrogate end points only (6).
The expert group recognized the need for ongoing
research and development (R&D) for highly innovative
and lifesaving products for URDs, in order to increase
clinical disease understanding and produce robust evi-
dence on the clinical effectiveness of interventions
(‘technologies’ in the broadest sense).
Establishing ‘value for money’ (efficiency)
Further challenges are related to but extend beyond the
sphere of evidence generation to demonstrate clinical
effectiveness of technologies. These challenges are eco-
nomic in nature; they concern the efficiency or ‘value for
money’ offered by URD treatments:
. Across health care systems, there is a marked
heterogeneity regarding institutional arrangements.
This is mirrored by the situation that currently
established methodologies to determine ‘value for
money’ vary internationally, with a stronger utilitar-
ian tradition (as, e.g., in England) generally leading
2For a discussion of some of the most prevalent commercial strategies, see for
example W. Hughes-Wilson et al. (2012) (5).
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to a higher acceptance of ‘efficiency-first’ evaluation
principles, whereas stronger emphasis on a rights-
based approach (and a corresponding legal tradi-
tion, as e.g., in some continental European countries
such as France and Germany) has led to a stronger
reliance on approaches based on unmet medical
need and on evidence of comparative clinical effec-
tiveness for the allocation of health care resources.
. In applied health economics  in contrast to neo-
classical welfare economics  health outcomes (rather
than ‘utility’) are usually considered to be the ap-
propriate benefit for evaluation. This ‘extra-welfarist’
view has been gaining popularity because of the
widespread belief that basic necessities ‘such as life,
health, and citizenship [. . .] should be distributed less
unequally than the ability to pay for them’ (J. Tobin
(1970), p. 263 (7)). Usually this currently prevailing
health economic evaluation paradigm is accompa-
nied by the assumption that the objective of collec-
tively financed health schemes ought to be simple
maximization of the aggregate health gain produced
for the population covered by the scheme. If and
when health gains are measured in terms of QALYs,
extra-welfarism then translates into QALY maximi-
zation, a normative hypothesis that has been en-
dorsed by extra-welfarists on grounds of an alleged
‘consensus in the literature’ (G.W. Torrance (2006),
p. 1071 (8)).
. From there it is possible and straightforward to
establish a ranking of medical interventions based
on their efficiency as defined by their incremental
cost per QALY gained (sometimes called QALY
league tables, based on incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios, ICERs), implying a presumably increasing
social desirability of services associated with de-
creasing ICERs. In practice, this approach translates
into the adoption of some sort of a benchmark for
the maximum allowable cost per QALY, which may
be interpreted as the social willingness to pay for,
or the shadow price of, a QALY. Interventions meet-
ing this benchmark criterion will then be deemed
‘efficient’ given a resource constraint.
. Notwithstanding claims of distributive neutrality (‘a
QALY is a QALY is a QALY, regardless of who gains
or loses it’), however, this approach implies consider-
able constraints on the preferences to be taken into
account. Any contextual variable(s)  apart from in-
dividual health gain  potentially influencing the
social desirability of (and hence the social willingness to
pay for) health services would necessarily violate the
basic assumption that all QALYs are created equally.
. If there were other objectives beyond the maximiza-
tion of population health (which represents the goal
of allocative efficiency), such as the wish to be treated
with dignity and respect or concerns about equity and
fairness (e.g., with regard to equality of access to care,
equal access for equal need, etc.), these quite
obviously would either result in differential cost-
per-QALY benchmarks as a function of these con-
cerns. Alternatively, they might even require an
entirely new evaluation paradigm. This issue has
been described using the notion of horizontal equity
(i.e., the equal treatment of equals) versus vertical
equity (i.e., the unequal but equitable treatment of
unequals, which would imply differentiation based on
characteristics of the respective diseases and the
patient groups afflicted with them).
. As noted in the introduction, many interventions
for rare diseases and URDs are unlikely or alto-
gether unable to meet standard cost-per-QALY bench-
marks. Hence, there is a need to examine the range of
normative and empirical issues surrounding the appli-
cation of the extra-welfarist logic of cost-effectiveness
(as a criterion for allocative efficiency) for the prioritiza-
tion of health care programs. It is noteworthy that, in an
attempt to escape from contentious interpersonal
comparisons, politicians and health care policy makers
in some jurisdictions, such as the United States and
Germany, have deliberately decided to refrain from the
computation of cost per QALY gained, in essence
restricting themselves to the evaluation of comparative
effectiveness PCORI in the United States and GBA in
Germany as a result of the most recent health care
reform acts) or, at best, of technical efficiency (e.g.,
methods guidance by IQWiG in Germany, designed to
avoid using the same benchmarks for all interventions,
across different disorders).
. With either approach, there remains the need to
establish fair boundaries with regard to coverage
(reimbursement) and pricing and, as an immediate
consequence, with regard to access to medical
technologies, given the limited willingness of the
public to be taxed (or the limited social willingness
to pay for health insurance).
Social preferences and valuation
Specific normative as well as technical problems arise
when traditional HTAs include costutility analyses, with
QALYs as a measure of health-related outcomes (and
their individual valuation) for URDs:
. Social value, as indicated by the social preferences of
the population covered by a national health scheme
(NHS) or an insurance plan, is not identical to some
kind of an aggregate of individual utility (which is
usually assumed to be approximated sufficiently well
by the strength of individual preferences, usually
derived either from patients or, more often, from a
representative sample of the general population).
Determining the value of medical technologies to treat URDs
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. Rather, social preferences notably include equity
concerns and a ‘sharing’ perspective:
Perhaps the best documented and least controver-
sial contextual variable is severity of the initial
health state. In studies, people consistently show a
strong preference to prioritize health care for the
worst off, and this priority has been found to be
largely (although not totally) independent from the
improvement achieved by an intervention (i.e., the
difference between the pre- and post-intervention
health state as captured by the conventional
computation of incremental QALY gains).
In addition, a social preference has been found for
giving priority to those with more urgent condi-
tions. The term ‘rule of rescue’ has been coined to
describe the moral imperative people feel to rescue
people facing avoidable death, largely irrespective
of considerations of cost-effectiveness.
In contrast to QALY-based valuation, capacity to
benefit might be less relevant, as people appear to
value additional health gains lower, once a certain
(however, not readily quantifiable) minimum effect
has been shown to be achieved by an intervention.
Other patient attributes that have been found to
exert an impact on the public’s prioritization
preferences include (younger) age, parent and
caregiver status, and (non-) smoker.
Finally, the decision rules of the logic of cost-
effectiveness will lead to ‘all-or-nothing’ decisions
on programs, depending on whether they are
located above or below the cut-off line for effi-
ciency. However, studies have shown that people
are not at all indifferent to the fact that this way
certain groups of patients would be entirely
excluded from receiving health benefits; rather,
there was a consistent willingness to sacrifice some
efficiency in order to achieve equity in access.
. In light of the observations above, QALYs, con-
ceptualized as a preference-based measure of indi-
vidual health-related outcomes combining quality
and length of life, seemingly fail to capture the full
value of URD technologies. Hence they need to be
complemented by or replaced with alternatives that
include societal preferences, such as concerns for
equity in access to treatment.
. Current (cost-per-QALY) ICER thresholds used for
cost-effectiveness (or more precisely, costutility)
analysis are largely arbitrary and inappropriate when
used to evaluate URD technologies; their application
may lead to positively unethical conclusions that
might deprive patients with URDs any chance of
access to effective care, thus conflicting with fairness-
and rights-based considerations.
. The very existence of such thresholds (outside the
confines of the narrow extra-welfarist framework)
depends on the validity of the QALY maximization
hypothesis, whereas systematic reviews of the litera-
ture have convincingly shown that this assumption is
‘descriptively flawed’, that is, these thresholds do not
capture well-established social preferences beyond
the quasi-utilitarian (health outcomes) maximization
principle (which, by design, is ‘distribution-blind’).
. Attempts to apply modifiers to account for severity
of disease (so-called ‘equity’ or ‘severity weights’) in
economic assessments of technologies for URDs
have not fully reflected the large number of con-
textual variables and cannot solve the underlying
issues with regard to fair chances to have access to
effective treatment.
Social preferences and costs
1) Importantly, studies further suggest that the impor-
tance of costs may be overstated by conventional
health economic evaluations, since cost-minimization,
cost-effectiveness, costutility, and costbenefit ana-
lyses, by definition, focus significantly on cost. In
contrast to this, the public does not appear to be well
prepared to deny patient treatment merely on the
basis of cost  which apparently constitutes a social
preference related to some kind of fairness or rights-
based reasoning similar to the dislike of ‘all-or-
nothing’ decisions but does not necessarily imply
valuing ‘rarity’ per se.
2) Costs per patient for URD treatment will necessarily
tend to be (much) higher than cost per patient for more
common disorders, given the R&D issues delineated
above, in combination with the fixed-cost nature of
R&D expenses, logistical challenges, and (sometimes)
manufacturing complexities. As to cost, most technol-
ogies for URDs have a limited overall budget impact,
particularly when weighed against the clinical and
societal benefits of such treatments:
3) Although this observation is usually true for in-
dividual treatments, the combined budgetary impact
of the health service costs for many URDs may be
more profound.3
4) However, URD treatments represent only a presum-
ably small part of the entire group of orphan drugs.
Discussion: potential ways forward
Collectively, the findings and observations summarized
above underscore the need for an evaluation paradigm
capturing and reflecting social preferences in a better way
3This will be especially relevant if and when orphan drugs, cancer treatments,
and recent developments described as ‘personalized medicine’ are taken into
account, too; however, the focus of the present discussion is specifically on the
extreme case of URDs  for orphan drugs, recent estimates of budget impact
seem to converge at 33.5% of the drug budget in many European
countries (9).
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than the conventional logic of cost-effectiveness, with
potentially far-reaching implications for the evaluation of
URDs.
Evidence of clinical effectiveness
The starting point of any value analysis can only be clinical
benefit. In their comprehensive review of the first decade of
orphan drug legislation in the European Union, Roberta
Joppi and colleagues (2013) found that many orphan drugs
were approved with evidence of surrogate end point effects
only (6). In the absence of sufficiently strong evidence for
some minimum significant benefit, however, the basis is
lacking for any robust value determination.
While recognizing the challenges associated with devel-
oping clinical interventions for URDs, the panel agreed
that evidence for improvement of surrogate end points only
should be no more than an interim attitude, providing a
basis for provisional approval and reimbursement, in order
to ensure patients fast access to new technologies. It could
be linked to managed entry schemes such as ‘coverage with
evidence development’ agreements in order to incentivize
further research. Even at a prevalence rate of a given
condition as low as 1/50,000 (the URD qualifier), there will
be about 10,000 patients in Europe. Thus it should be
possible to set up multinational randomized controlled
trials, including between 500 and 1,000 patients, designed
to show relevant clinical end point benefit. If necessary,
such trials might be supported by the not-for-profit
European Clinical Research Infrastructures Network in-
itiative devoted to promote multinational studies.
Perspectives on cost
As stated earlier, the cost per patient will tend to be
higher with decreasing prevalence. Budget impact, how-
ever, can be looked upon in various different ways.
1) One prevalent view (consistent with the efficiency-
first approach advocated by conventional health
economics) is that budget impact should not be
relevant to coverage decisions, which ought to be
based on incremental cost-effectiveness. For exam-
ple, NICE has taken the position that budget impact
analyses should not form part of the decision-
making process; rather, they should be used as a
tool aiding UK Regional Health Authorities in
implementing NICE guidance locally.
2) Given the ‘silence of the lambda’ (i.e., ICERs by
design providing no information on the dimension
of a program, as the sizes of the numerator and the
denominator cancel out (10)), health care policy
makers are concerned with the budget impact of
adopting a technology (consistent with the notion of
affordability), and methods have been proposed by
health economists for how it might be possible to
combine incremental cost-effectiveness and budget
impact into one metric.
3) If a social value perspective (instead of a focus on
individual utility) were to be adopted in a consistent
manner, then there could be simultaneous implica-
tions for the definition of social opportunity cost (or
value foregone), with the social value being driven by
the existence of a program (i.e., for example the value
people might attach to living in a society that
does not simply abandon certain groups of patients
who are unfortunate enough to suffer from a high-
cost illness) and opportunity cost by its budge-
tary impact. This would obviously shift the focus
from cost per patient to cost on the program level,
which indeed reflects the perspective of a real-world
decision maker (11).
4) Finally, a more pragmatic approach might combine
rights-based thinking in terms of a desire to offer
fair chances to receive effective treatment also to
patients with URDs with the realities of pharma-
ceutical R&D and its fixed-cost structure, resulting
in the implementation of price/volume trade-offs as
realized, for example, in France.
Valuation principles
Potential evaluation principles better (compared to the
logic of cost-effectiveness using cost-per-QALY bench-
marks) reflecting the public’s social preferences may
include, at different levels of analysis:
. A method combining traditional cost-effectiveness
with budget impact analysis
. Costvalue analysis by means of adjusting cost-per-
QALY benchmarks according to multiple contextual
variables
. Costvalue analysis using the person trade-off
method (12)
. Costvalue (or social utility) analysis using the
relative social willingness to pay instrument
. A multicriteria decision analysis framework
. Using ‘capability-adjusted life years’ instead of
QALYs as a measure of benefit
. Using healthy-year equivalents as a measure of
benefit
. Applying different perspectives on the measurement
of costs
. On the methodological level, discrete choice experi-
ments, conjoint analysis and/or analytical hierarchy
process techniques measuring and integrating ben-
efits from a patient’s perspective
All of these should be rigorously assessed for
their potential to improve on the currently predominant
standard, which is still represented by costutility analysis
(1). Given the limitations of the conventional approach,
the strengths and weaknesses of each of the alternatives
should be explored with high priority.
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Appendix II: Workshop agenda
Berlin, Germany, 8 November 2012
9:00 a.m. Welcome and introductions
9:30 a.m. Overview and discussion: background on
development of technologies for ultra-rare
diseases
10:00 a.m. Overview and discussion: technical pro-
blems with use of conventional health
technology assessments for technologies
for ultra-rare diseases
11:30 a.m. Identify areas of agreement on potentially
inappropriate use of conventional health
technology assessments for technologies
for ultra-rare diseases
12:15 p.m. Discussion: potential alternatives to eval-
uate technologies for ultra-rare diseases
2:00 p.m. Prioritize potential alternative evaluation
approaches for further discussion and next
steps
3:00 p.m. Workshop concludes
Appendix III: Abbreviations used
GBA: Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss (Joint Federal
Committee, the official HTA agency in Germany, in
charge of appraisal determinations)
HTA: health technology assessment
ICER: incremental cost effectiveness ratio
InnoVal-HC: Institute for Innovation & Valuation in
Health Care, a not-for-profit organization in Wiesbaden,
Germany
IQWiG: Institut fu¨r Qualita¨t und Wirtschaftlichkeit im
Gesundheitswesen (Institute for Quality and Efficiency in
Health Care, an official HTA agency in Germany, tasked
with technology assessments)
ISPOR: International Society for Pharmacoeconomics
and Outcomes Research
NHS: National Health Service (UK), or national health
scheme (generic)
NICE: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
in London, England, established in 1999 as official body
in charge of HTAs for the UK NHS
PCORI: Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute,
an independent nonprofit, nongovernmental organization
located in Washington, DC, authorized by the US
Congress in 2010.
QALY: quality-adjusted life year
R&D: research and development
URD: ultra-rare disorder
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